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The last two decades have witnessed a worldwide wave of reforms that have
signi¯cantly a®ected both the market structure and the institutions in the
infrastructure industries including high-tech sectors such as telecommunica-
tions or electricity and more traditional domains such as water or postal
services. In developed countries, the main objective of these reforms has
been to improve the functioning of industries traditionally organized as what
has become to be recognized as ill-performing public or private monopolies.
The fundamental policy task has then been to redesign the legal and regu-
latory frameworks so as to generate \proper" economic incentives in those
industries, namely, inventives for operators to enhance their o®erings, in par-
ticular, in terms of cost e±ciency, quality of service, and tari®s.
While the reforms conducted in developing countries have been grounded
on similar principles, in practice they di®ered markedly in at least two re-
spects. First, even though there was clearly room for improving the perfor-
mance of infrastructure industries in developed countries, one should recog-
nize that in these countries service was typically available whereas in develop-
ing countries it was sometimes merely non existent. This was for instance the
case in the telecommunications industry when networks were not developed
in large parts of the developing countries' rural areas.
Second, and most importantly, the task of institutional design was far
more challenging in developing countries. Developed countries essentially
needed to work on how to modernize an already existing institutional fabric
and a complex system of functioning rules built over a long history of political
and economic administration of market economies. It is safe to say that in
most of the cases, although for di®erent reasons, this crucial experience was
just lacking in developing countries. Beyond the fact that these countries
had to follow the industrialized world in the setting of new institutions to
regulate the reformed industries, an uneasy task by itself given the scarcity
of human capital, they could only expect to deal with a severe inadequacy of
the old administrative functioning rules. This inadequacy would be certainly
felt more at the global level of the functioning of political institutions than
2at the local level of the governance of regulatory institutions.
More recently, policy makers in developing countries have pushed further
the process of reforms of their infrastructure industries. After a period of
implementation of policies of liberalization and privatization of some seg-
ments coupled with the creation of regulatory authorities, large e®orts have
been allocated to improve the e±ciency of the working of these authorities.
Degree of independence, capacity of human capital, and particularly quality
of governance are the three policy items that have mobilized much of these
e®orts. On the research front, however, both theoretical work on the optimal
design of regulatory institutions and empirical work on the measurement of
regulatory institutions' performance suggest that these speci¯c items should
not be analyzed independently from more general factors related to the gov-
ernance of the economy as a whole. The main purpose of this paper is to
investigate the relative weight of these factors in regulatory performance by
means of an econometric analysis of two data sets on the telecommunications
industry in developing and developed countries.
The determinants of regulatory performance have been discussed both
in the theoretical and empirical streams of the literature on infrastructure
industries regulation. For our purpose, we distinguish two approaches. A
¯rst approach, which is conceptual in nature and inspired by political sci-
ence, argues that when thinking about regulatory performance the relevant
game is to be found upstream at the (higher) level of politics (Spiller and
Tommasi, 2003). Another more empirical approach emphasizes the impact
of regulatory governance on performance (Cubbin and Stern, 2005b). Our
general view is that indeed the relationship between political structures and
regulatory processes has to be given due attention when assessing regulatory
performance. Hence, our study might be viewed as an attempt to merge
both of these approaches in order to feed in some empirical elements to the
debate on the relationship between political and regulatory institutions that
so far has mainly taken place at a conceptual level.
Our empirical strategy consists in implementing a series of econometric
tests with a special attention given to variables that capture political account-
3ability, a concept that we consider as fundamental in the exercise of the link
between political structures and regulatory processes. Hence, we regard the
(political game) equilibrium level of political accountability as an important
determinant of the regulatory process' performance. This leads us to set up,
and illustrate with our data, a test having as the null hypothesis that, all
things equal, more political accountability should enhance the performance
of regulation. In addition to merely testing its signi¯cance, we attempt to
give some empirical substance to the conjecture that political accountability
has an even stronger e®ect in developing countries.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes some
of the main theoretical and empirical arguments recently put forward in
the literature on the design of institutions and the evaluation of regulatory
performance in infrastructure industries. This section is not meant to be
exhaustive but rather to serve the purpose of arguing that there is a need
to merge these two streams of the literature on regulatory institutions. Sec-
tion 3 describes the basic econometric-theoretical ingredients that constitute
the elements of the empirical methodology we use to analyze two data sets
on 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries covering the period
1985-1999. In section 4, we discuss the results of a preliminary analysis of
these data. Our objective there is to uncover some general properties of the
data and attempt to establish a diagnostic of stationarity for the regulatory
performance variables.
The actual empirical analysis of the relationship between political ac-
countability and regulatory performance is taken up in Section 5 in two-steps.
First, in subsection 5.1 we investigate the existence of causality relationships.
This causation analysis provides us with a set of variables that could be cred-
ibly used as independent variables in regressions of regulatory performance
on political accountability variables. The results of such regressions are dis-
cussed in subsection 5.2. Section 6 summarizes our empirical ¯ndings and
discusses some policy implications. A detailed description of the data used,
their sources, and some complementary material are given in the appendix.
2From a normative analysis perspective, assuming that regulatory performance in-
creases social welfare, such a ¯nding would suggest that marginal social bene¯t of political
accountability is higher in developing countries.
42 Design of institutions and regulatory
performance: The need for an integrated
approach
Recent contributions to the theory of the design of institutions and empirical
work concerned with the measurement of their performance have brought to
daylight the issue of the performance of regulation.3 Two approaches have
been followed to examine the determinants of regulatory performance and
outcomes. A ¯rst approach is conceptual and analyzes the role of political
structures and processes. A second approach, more empirical in nature,
emphasizes the impact of the quality of regulatory governance. We brie°y
review the main arguments developed by these two approaches and point
to the need to develop a uni¯ed analytical framework. This study is a ¯rst
empirical e®ort exerted towards this direction.
The ¯rst approach analyzes the relationship between political structures
and processes and the conduct of regulation by emphasizing the need to open
the black box of the organization and functioning of governments (see Estache
and Martimort, 1999 and North, 2000).4 In their analysis of the link between
politics and regulation in the US, McCubbins et al. (1987) argue that, by
reducing the costs of monitoring and by sharpening sanctions, administrative
procedures can give rise to an equilibrium in which compliance with the
preferences of political agents is greater than it otherwise would be.5 This
relationship is explored by Levy and Spiller (1994) in the telecommunications
sector through an analysis of case studies. In particular, they evaluate the
potential for political agents to manipulate the regulatory process. They ¯nd
3La®ont (2005) devotes two chapters of his book on regulation and economic develop-
ment to the discussion of issues related to the design of proper institutions in developing
countries.
4By putting the political game at the heart of the analysis, this approach ¯ts in the New
Institutional Economics paradigm founded on the precepts of transaction cost theory and
positive political economy. This constitutes an important departure from the standard
normative approach to public economics.
5Bottom-up \¯re-alarm" monitoring through external agents who are a®ected by regu-
latory agencies' policies is a good example of a method that can reduce the informational
costs of following the activities of agencies (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
5that sector performance can be satisfactory under a wide range of regulatory
procedures as long as arbitrary administrative moves can be restrained.
The link between the political and regulatory spheres is further analyzed
in Spiller and Tommasi (2003) through the impact that the characteristics
of political environments have on the ability of political agents to reach in-
tertemporal cooperation. They argue that long term political cooperation is
more likely to lead to stable and °exible regulatory policies, i.e, to e®ective
regulation, when the agents with decision power have strong intertemporal
relationships, policy and political moves are widely observable, good enforce-
ment technologies are available, political exchanges take place in arenas where
the previous features are satis¯ed, and the short-run payo®s from noncooper-
ation are not so high. For example, these authors argue that more ine±cient
regulatory rules, i.e, a rigid regulatory context, may in fact provide higher
incentives for investment whereas granting discretion to the regulator may
lead to arbitrary outcomes if institutional endowments are low.
Heller and McCubbins (1996) argue that incentives for investing in in-
frastructure industries are not credible within a given regulatory structure
unless there is a political context that makes them sustainable. Regulatory
predictability is a key feature for gaining credibility, and hence the impor-
tance role of political institutions in enhancing this predictability. The higher
the quality of the political and institutional environment, the more di±cult
it is to change regulatory structures and procedures. In particular, the more
veto political players with e®ective authority there are, the easier it is to
block policy changes.
Let us now turn to an overview of the empirical approach that empha-
sizes the role of regulatory governance. The fundamental belief that moti-
vates much of this line of research that essentially deals with infrastructure
industries is that good regulatory governance is a prerequisite to a proper
functioning of the positive relationship between regulatory incentives and
regulatory performance. This belief is based on the conjecture that \..reg-
ulatory agencies with better governance should make fewer mistakes, have
their mistakes identi¯ed and recti¯ed better and more quickly, so that good
6regulatory practice is more readily established and maintained." (Cubbin
and Stern, 2000a)
The basic empirical implications of these \theoretical" hypotheses is that,
thanks to the structuring and the practice of regulation it entails (e.g., as
an independent regulator that makes transparent regulatory decisions), bet-
ter regulatory governance increases capacity and enhances productive and
allocative e±ciency. In the case of telecommunications, which is the sec-
tor concerned by our study, these implications are typically tested in data
collected on a set of developing countries observed during a given time pe-
riod. Regulatory performance is measured by mainline penetration rates and
mainlines per employee, and regulatory governance is captured in an index
(see Gutierrez, 2003a) that aggregates a set of aspects related to the struc-
turation and internal organization of regulation. The methodology applied
to both telecommunications (Gutierrez, 2003b) and electricity (Cubbin and
Stern, 2000a) yields a positive impact of regulatory governance on output.6
A typical contribution to this line of research starts from the global con-
ceptual view that the \..institutional quality is the dominant determinant
of variations in long-term growth performance."7 However, in its imple-
mentation part often it only accounts for micro dimensions of institutional
quality embodied in what is referred to as the quality of regulatory gover-
nance. Our view is that this approach should substantially gain in richness
by drawing lessons from the literature on the design of institutions discussed
in the beginning of this section. Our goal then is to take a step towards a
uni¯ed approach that, when evaluating regulatory performance, in addition
to specifying variables of regulatory governance, explicitly incorporates vari-
ables that link political and regulatory structures and processes. Hence, our
study can be viewed as a ¯rst exploration of the relative merits of such an
integrated empirical approach.
In our empirical analysis, the variables through which the interface be-
tween political and regulatory structures and processes is going to materialize
6For a survey of empirical studies on regulatory performance and regulatory governance
in developing countries, see Cubbin and Stern (2005b).
7See Cubbin and Stern (2005a) and the citations thereof.
7are variables that are used to proxy the concept of political accountability.
Broadly speaking, this concept may bede¯ned as \..a proactive process by
which public o±cials inform about and justify their plans of action, their
behavior and results and are sanctioned accordingly."8 A key idea here is
that limiting the use and sanctioning the abuse of political power should
help disentangling regulatory processes from the opportunistic behavior of
political agents.9
The elections mechanism should, in principle, ensure political account-
ability since citizens select representatives who hold bureaucrats and mem-
bers of the judiciary system accountable for their behavior. However, this
property of elections is hard to satisfy since the electoral process su®ers from
important information asymmetries between elected politicians and citizens
and lack of politicians ex post accountability. Hence, \marketization" poli-
cies of some segments of infrastructure industries, including the privatization
of government monopolies, liberalization, and the application of private man-
agement principles to state-owned entreprises, have proved to be reforms that
improve political agents' accountability in a much more targeted way. When
analyzing regulatory performance, beyond giving full consideration to such
pro-accountability reforms as the above marketization policies, the indepen-
dence of the regulator, and other factors related to the sector's regulatory
governance, we believe that it is also important to give due attention to other
pro-accountability factors that are related to the governance of the economy
as a whole. Our empirical study is a modest e®ort motivated by such a belief.
3 Econometric methodology
Our empirical investigation of the impact of political accountability on reg-
ulatory performance relies on a series of regressions. In each of these regres-
8See Ackerman (2005).
9As noted by Spiller and Tommasi (2003), opportunistic behavior of politicians can be
expected in infrastructure industries because of the important economic stakes involved.
Indeed, these industries are characterized by very large sunk costs, substantial economies
of scale, and a wide domestic consumption.
8sions, the dependent variable is a variable that measures regulatory perfor-
mance and the independent variables that retain much of our attention are
variables that are used to capture political accountability. In view of the
framework discussed in the previous section that forms the conceptual foun-
dations of this empirical study, these variables of political accountability are
regrouped into variables of \local" accountability meant to re°ect the quality
of regulatory governance in the sector, and variables of \global" accountabil-
ity meant to re°ect the quality of political governance in the economy as a
whole.
Regulatory performance is measured by the level of output (mainline pen-
etration or cellular subscription), e±ciency (mainlines per employee), or price
(¯xed residential, cellular). Local accountability is captured in variables re-
°ecting the degree of political and ¯nancial independence of the regulator,
the level of transparency of accounts and regulatory decisions, the clarity of
the allocation of tasks among institutions, the nature of the legal environ-
ment, and the degree of social participation in regulatory decisions.10 As
to global accountability, it is captured in variables re°ecting the quality of
the institutional framework (government integrity, e±ciency of bureaucracy,
strength of courts and enforcement capacity, government's commitment ca-
pacity, and currency risk) and the quality of the political process (strength of
checks and balances).11 When estimating the relationship between political
accountability and regulatory performance, we control for some other vari-
ables that are deemed important such as the degree of privatization of the
incumbent and the level of competition. We also account for endogeneity
when it is appropriate to do so.
10Thus, unlike most analyses of the impact of the reforms in infrastructure sectors,
this study accounts for a large set of regulatory governance dimensions. Exceptions are
Gutierrez (2003b) and Holder and Stern (1999) who have constructed detailed indices of
regulators' characteristics in Latin American countries for the telecom sector, and in Asian
countries for the electricity sector, respectively. These dimensions have been emphasized
in the literature (see, e.g., Estache and Martimort, 1999) as important for regulatory
agencies to be sustainable.
11Both the empirical and theoretical literatures suggest that it is not so much the extent
of democracy that is relevant to investors but rather the ability of the government to
credibly commit to a policy regime. To capture the level of policy stability, we choose to
use an index that indicates whether there is an \e®ective" number of checks and balances.
9Given the type of our data which are time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS),
we choose to apply the Di®erenced Generalized Method of Moments (DIF-
GMM) to estimate the relationships of interest. Lagrange multiplier and
Wald tests applied to the data support the presence of dynamics and ¯xed
e®ects which suggested to us the use of this method developed by Arellano
and Bond (1991) for analyzing panel data and applied by Beck and Katz
(2004) to TSCS data.12 A typical relationship is speci¯ed as a dynamic
equation given by
log(yit) = ®0 + ®1 log(yit¡1) + x
0
it¯ + ¹i + ²it (1)
where i = 1;2;:::;N, t = 1;2;:::;T, yit is a one-dimensional dependent
variable representing regulatory performance, ®0 and ®1 are scalar parame-
ters, xit is a vector of regressors representing, among other things, politi-
cal accountability, ¯ is the associated vector of parameters, ¹i captures a
country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect, and ²it is a disturbance term.13 The indices i
and t refer to the country and the year respectively. For both data sets used
in the analysis T = 15.14 For the data set on developing countries, N = 29,
and for that on developed countries, N = 23.15 The following (standard)
assumptions are made:
E(¹i) = 0; E(²it) = 0; E(²it¹i) = 0; E(yi1²it) = 0 (2)
In this setting, estimation can be potentially plagued by endogeneity com-
ing from a correlation of two types: a correlation between the regressors and
the ¯xed e®ect term, on the one hand, and a correlation between the regres-
sors and the disturbance term, on the other hand. In our context, one might
expect a possible correlation between the extent of reforms captured by some
12We are well aware of the (not yet settled) debate on the statistical properties of various
methods used to ¯x problems due to dynamics in TSCS data. However, we choose to use
DIF-GMM because, as an instrumental variables (IV) estimation technique, this method
privileges consistency.
13Taking logs allows to minimize heteroskedasticity and in°uential outliers problems.
14These data sets cover the period 1985-1999.
15The lists of countries are given in the appendix.
10regressors and some country characteristics such as population density and
wealth which are embodied in the ¯xed e®ect term. Moreover, the regressors
used to capture the degree of privatization and competition are likely to be
endogenous, in particular, in the early stages of the reforms. For example,
licenses are typically granted conditional on the ful¯llment of some perfor-
mance targets based on penetration, quality, or some other dimensions of the
industry, and are often associated with exclusivity periods.16
The endogeneity problem stemming from the correlation of the ¯rst type
is taken care of by merely expressing equation (1) in ¯rst di®erences to obtain
¢log(yit) = ®1¢log(yit¡1) + ¢x
0
it¯ + ¢²it (3)
where ¢ is the ¯rst di®erence operator. However, this transformation brings
with it another endogeneity problem due to the contemporaneous correlation
between log(yit¡1) and the error term ²it¡1. But, note that this correlation is
of the same nature as the correlation of the second type mentioned above.17
The question therefore boils down to ¯nding instruments which can be used
in the estimation of equation (3).
We follow a standard approach in which lagged values of the potentially
endogenous regressors are taken as possible instruments and then appropriate
lag lengths are selected by investigating whether the disturbance term is
serially uncorrelated or follows a moving average process of some order q,
MA(q). In the case of a serially uncorrelated disturbance term, we have
E(²it²is) = 0 for t 6= s, and the variables y and x lagged two and more
periods are valid instruments.18 If the disturbance term is a MA(1), we have
16Endogeneity might also be a concern when using variables to capture some aspects
of the structuration of regulation (see La®ont, 2005 for a discussion of some important
factors that in°uence the structuration of regulatory institutions). A good example is
the variable that indicates whether or not there exists an independent regulator. Indeed,
the decision to create, and the timing of the creation of an independent regulator can be
in°uenced by pre-regulatory performance. For an empirical account of the endogeneity of
regulatory policies, see Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2006), Gutierrez (2003), and Ros (1999,
2003), among others.
17In fact, this problem concerns any other predetermined variable.
18Indeed, it can be seen that for T ¸ 3, E(¢²it log(yit¡t0)) = 0 and E(xit¡t0¢²it) =
11E(²it²it¡l) 6= 0 for l · 1 and E(²it²it¡l) = 0 for l > 1, and the variables y and
x lagged three and more periods are valid instruments. More generally, if the
disturbance term follows a MA(q), the valid instruments are y and x lagged
(2 + q) and more periods.19
Another technical issue that needs to be addressed is that of stationarity
of the dependent variable. Indeed, lack of stationarity can have two conse-
quences in our context. A ¯rst consequence is that any estimation method
applied to such a dynamic system is likely to be inaccurate.20 A second
consequence has to do with the application of DIF-GMM. The available in-
struments for the equation in ¯rst di®erences are likely to be weak which
would impoverish the ¯nite-sample properties of the estimator.21
To address stationarity, we follow Blundell and Bond (1998) who ¯nd
that when series are close to non stationarity, DIF-GMM underestimates
the coe±cients of an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)). For each
candidate dependent variable (the regulatory performance variables), we then
estimate an AR(1) with both DIF-GMM and System GMM (SYS-GMM)
where the latter uses, in addition to the moment conditions used in DIF-
GMM, instruments in ¯rst di®erences for the equation in levels (log(yit)).
The use of SYS-GMM requires the following additional assumptions:
0; i = 1;2;:::;N; t = 3;:::;T; t0 = 2;:::;t ¡ 1.
19In practice, we start by using as instruments for the equation in ¯rst di®erences the
variables log(y) and x lagged two and more periods . If the disturbance term in ¯rst
di®erences presents no second-order autocorrelation, we are facing a serially uncorrelated
disturbance term in levels which therefore says that the instruments used are valid. If the
disturbance term in ¯rst di®erences presents a second-order autocorrelation, this indicates
that, in levels, this term follows a moving average process and that the dependent variables
log(y) and x lagged two periods is endogenous and hence is not a valid instrument. We
then repeat the procedure by using, as instruments for the equation in ¯rst di®erences,
the variables log(y) and x lagged n times (n ¸ 3) and more until we ¯nd no second-order
autocorrelation in the disturbance term in ¯rst di®erences.
20For example, Beck and Katz (2004) show that with a non stationary dependent vari-
able, the dispersion of the value of the coe±cient in an autoregressive process of order one
found with di®erent asymptotically equivalent methods often exceeds its standard errors.
21To illustrate this point, assume that the dependent variable follows the AR(1) process
log(yit) = ®log(yit¡1)+¹i +²it with ® ! 1, i.e., the dependent variable becomes increas-
ingly non stationary. Then, the instrument log(yit¡2) is not correlated with the regressor
¢log(yit¡1) in (3). Indeed, ¢log(yit¡1) = (® ¡ 1)log(yit¡2) + ¹i + ²it¡1 ! ¹i + ²it¡1.
12E(¢log(yi2)¹i) = 0; E(¢xi2¹i) = 0; i = 1;:::;N (4)
As shown by Arellano and Bover (1995), since the SYS-GMM approach is
immune to the weak instrument problem in the case of close to non station-
arity, we use it as a benchmark.22 It is then possible to use as instruments
in the equation in levels, the endogenous variables f¢y;¢xg lagged one pe-
riod when the disturbance is serially uncorrelated, and lagged (q+1) periods
when it follows a MA(q).23
As indicated in the beginning of this section, our investigation of the role
of political accountability relies on a set of regressions. While the estimation
of the coe±cients of these regressions allows us to assess the (quantitative)
impact of the political accountability variables on the regulatory performance
variables, asking ¯rst whether there exists a causal relationship between these
variables will allow us to meaningfully interpret this impact. We therefore
perform some causality tests by combining the DIF-GMM estimation tech-
nique with a Granger-causality testing procedure developed in Holtz-Eakin










it¯ + ¢²it (5)
which we use to see whether the variable used to capture political account-
ability, x, \Granger-causes" the variable used to measure regulatory perfor-
mance, y. Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), we initially set the lag length
22The way we use SYS-GMM as a benchmark is as follows. When this method yields an
AR(1) coe±cient greater than or equal to one, i.e., when the dependent variable is a pure
non stationary stochastic process, we take ¯rst di®erences and check stationarity again.
When SYS-GMM yields close to unit root (the dependent variable is close to being non
stationary) and DIF-GMM yields a substantially smaller coe±cient, then again, we work
with ¯rst di®erences. Otherwise, i.e., when SYS-GMM doesn't yield close to unit root or
yields close to unit root but DIF-GMM doesn't underestimate the AR(1) coe±cient, we
directly work with levels as this doesn't weaken the statistical properties of the estimator.
23Indeed, it can be seen that E(¢log(yit¡1¡q)(¹i+²it)) = 0 and E(¢xit¡1¡q(¹i+²it)) =
0, i = 1;2;:::;N; t = 3 + q;:::;T.
13m equal to 3 and check whether this lag length is \acceptable" by means of
a Wald test of the signi¯cance of ®3 and ±3. If such a lag length is accepted,
we test the joint signi¯cance of ±1, ±2, and ±3 and conclude on whether x
does not cause the variable y. If the lag length is not accepted, we repeat the
procedure using the next smaller lag length. In the case where no lag length
is accepted, we conclude that no causality running from x to y exists.24
4 Preliminary empirical analysis
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we attempt to uncover some
general properties of the raw data from an examination of their descriptive
statistics.25 Second, we discuss the outcome of our investigation of the sta-
tionarity of the regulatory performance variables. Tables A1-A6 given in the
appendix exhibit the list of variables and their designation, standard sum-
mary statistics, correlation coe±cients for some variables of interest, and
compounded annual rates of increase for the data on developing and devel-
oped countries.
From Tables A2 and A5, we see that the correlations between variables of
regulatory performance and political accountability are generally stronger for
developing countries than for developed countries. This is particularly the
case when regulatory performance is measured by mainline penetration (ml),
cellular subscription (cel), and mainlines per employee (eff), and political
accountability is captured by the strength of checks and balances (checks).
The same is true when regulatory performance is measured by mainlines per
employee and political accountability is captured by the regulatory gover-
nance index (reg), and when regulatory performance is measured by price
of cellular (p cel) and political accountability is captured by the quality of
24Strictly speaking, these causality tests concern the transformed variables as shown
in equation (5). The political accountability variable x will represent in turn the qual-
ity of the regulatory governance, of the institutional environment, and of the political
process. See the appendix for a precise de¯nition of the variables used to capture political
accountability.
25This step should only be taken as a ¯rst diagnosis of the data that will, at best, suggest
some of their aspects to be examined with some details.
14the institutional environment (institutional). We also observe that, in both
samples, the regulatory performance variables tend to correlate more with
the variables which re°ect the quality of the institutional environment than
those that re°ect the quality of the political process or the regulatory gover-
nance.
Tables A3 and A6 reveal that, when measured by mainline penetration,
cellular subscription, or mainlines per employee, regulatory performance has,
on average, increased twice as much in developing countries than in devel-
oped countries over the 1985-1999 period. This might be due to the fact
that, in the early part of the period, unmet demand was more important in
developing countries. When measured by the monthly subscription to the
¯xed service (which has increased in both types of countries) or the price
of cellular (which has decreased in both types of countries) instead, regula-
tory performance seems to have improved more in developed countries. The
signi¯cantly higher increase of the monthly subscription to the ¯xed tele-
phone service in developing countries might be due to the fact that policies
of tari® rebalancing have been relatively more intense in these countries. As
the signi¯cantly lower decrease of price of cellular in developing countries,
it might re°ect a relatively less e®ective competition in this segment of the
market as compared to developed countries. To conclude this brief check up
of the data, we note the evolution of the quality of the institutional environ-
ment and the political process showing a higher improvement in developing
countries. However, this might only re°ect the fact that these countries were
lagging behind on these two dimensions.
We now discuss the outcome of our investigation of the stationarity of
the regulatory performance variables which will be the dependent variables
of our regressions. Tables A7 and A8 given in the appendix show the results
of the estimation of an AR(1) with both the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM
methods applied to the variables in levels, and then with the DIF-GMM
method applied to the variables in ¯rst di®erences in the cases where they are
found to be non stationary in levels.26 These tables give the DIF-GMM and
26A time trend is included in all AR(1) estimations to allow for stationarity around a
trend.
15SYS-GMM (one-step robust) estimates of the AR(1) coe±cient, the estimate
of the time trend coe±cient, Time, the ¯rst- and second-order autocorrelation
coe±cients of the residuals in ¯rst di®erences, m1 and m2, the value of
the J statistic for testing the validity of instruments, the value of the Dif-
Sargan statistic that allows us to test the validity of the additional SYS-
GMM conditions, the value of the starting lag of the instruments, L, and the
number of observations actually used.27
From these two tables, we see that in almost all the AR(1) estimations,
second-order autocorrelation of the residuals in ¯rst di®erences (m2) is re-
jected using as instruments the initial lag of two periods and more for the
variables in levels and one period for the variable in ¯rst di®erences. This
con¯rms then the validity of these instruments. The only exception is the
mainline penetration series (in ¯rst di®erences) in the data set on developing
countries. In this case, we ¯nd empirical evidence that the disturbance term
in levels follows a MA(2). The valid instruments then are the variables in
levels lagged four periods and more for the equation in ¯rst di®erences, and
the variables in di®erences lagged three periods and more for the equation
in levels. In fact, the J test never rejects the validity of the instruments.28
We also see that the Dif-Sargan test never rejects the additional moment
conditions required to use SYS-GMM.
From Table A7, we see that the SYS-GMM AR(1) coe±cient is greater
than or equal to one for the series mainline penetration (ml), cellular sub-
scription (cel), and mainlines per employee (eff), and hence conclude that
these series are non stationary. Stationary is achieved when taking their ¯rst
di®erences as can be seen from the results of DIF-GMM applied to these ¯rst
di®erences shown at the right of the table. We therefore use these ¯rst dif-
27In all the tables presented in this paper, we indicate the signi¯cance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% con¯dence level by the superscript ¤, ¤¤, and ¤¤¤ respectively. Even if two-
step GMM is known to be asymptotically more e±cient than one-step GMM, we omit
the two-step GMM estimates as we ¯nd that their asymptotic standard errors tend to be
abnormally small even when we make the ¯nite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer
(2000). In fact, Arellano and Bond (1991) show by means of simulations that this apparent
gain in precision might come at the cost of a downward ¯nite-sample bias.
28Let us mention that Blundell and Bond (1999) interpret a rejection with such a J test
as possibly due to measurement errors.
16ferences in the remainder of the analysis of the data on developing countries.
We further see from this table that the estimates of the AR(1) coe±cient
obtained with DIF-GMM applied to the series monthly subscription to ¯xed
and price of cellular are smaller than those obtained with SYS-GMM. We
conclude that the instruments for the equation in ¯rst di®erences are weak
and hence we also use these series in ¯rst di®erences.
Concerning the data on the developed countries, we see from Table A8
that the estimates of the AR(1) coe±cient obtained with DIF-GMM applied
to the series mainlines per employee (eff), monthly subscription to ¯xed
(p res), and price of cellular (p cel) are also smaller than those obtained
when SYS-GMM is applied instead. We therefore conclude again that the
instruments for the equation in ¯rst di®erences are weak and use these series
in ¯rst di®erences as well.29
5 Analysis of the relationship between
political accountability and regulatory
performance
5.1 Causality results
In this subsection we address the issue of the existence of causal relationships
between the variables of political accountability and regulatory performance.
Tables A9-A14 given in the appendix show the DIF-GMM estimation results
on which we build our testing procedure asking whether the variables of lo-
cal accountability, namely, the regulatory governance index (reg) and global
accountability, namely, the institutional environment index (institutional)
and the index of checks and balances (checks), Granger-cause the variables
of regulatory performance, namely, mainline penetration (ml), cellular sub-
scription (cel), mainlines per employee (eff), monthly subscription to ¯xed
29In fact, for the purpose of our empirical analysis that seeks to cross-examine the
results found with the developing and developed countries data sets, we ultimately use the
regulatory performance series in ¯rst di®erences.
17(p res), and price of cellular (p cel).30
In addition to showing the estimated values of the parameters associated
with the explanatory variables listed at the left and some items already de-
scribed in section 4, namely, m1, m2, J, L, and Obs., Tables A9-A14 include
two Wald statistics. A ¯rst Wald statistic, Lag length, allows us to test for
the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cients associated with the dependent and the
explanatory variables with the highest lag length. A second Wald statistic,
Causality, allows us to test the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cients associ-
ated with the lagged political accountability variables when the Lag length
test accepts the signi¯cance of the appropriate coe±cients. The choice of
valid instruments is made by using information contained in these tables and
following the procedure discussed in section 3.31
From the results in Tables A9-A11 obtained with the data on developing
countries, we see that in all estimations there exists a certain lag length which
is accepted. Then, when proceeding to examine Granger-causality, Table
A9 shows that regulatory governance causes regulatory performance except
when using the cellular subscription or mainlines per employee variables to
measure regulatory performance.32 Table A10 shows that the institutional
environment causes regulatory performance independently of which of the ¯ve
variables is used to measure regulatory performance. Finally, we see from
Table A11 that the political process causes regulatory performance except
when the latter is measured by the variables mainlines per employee or price
of cellular. Table 1 below summarizes these ¯ndings on the existence of
causality relationships in the data on developing countries.
While some causality relationships are also found in the data on developed
countries, the empirical evidence is somewhat weaker than in the case of
30We also include in our estimations some additional control variables as needed and
account for any possible endogeneity problem. The estimates shown in these tables are
those of the parameters of equation (5).
31See also footnote (18). In all the estimations shown in these tables, the disturbance
term in levels is serially uncorrelated, except for the cellular subscription series (see Table
A9) where the disturbance term follows a MA(2), and for the price of cellular series (see
Tables A9 and A13) where it follows a MA(1).




Variable local accountability global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml Yes Yes Yes
cel No Yes Yes
eff No Yes No
p res Yes Yes Yes
p cel Yes Yes No
the data on developing countries. Indeed, from the results shown in Tables
A12-A14, we see that there are some estimations where no lag length and
hence no Granger-causality relationship is accepted. More speci¯cally, when
testing whether regulatory governance causes regulatory performance and
the latter is measured by mainline penetration or price of cellular, no lag
length is accepted (see Table A12). Hence, we conclude that regulatory
governance does not cause regulatory performance in either of these two
cases. In the same vein, these data on developing countries do not show
causality relationships between the institutional environment and regulatory
performance when the latter is measured by mainlines per employee or price
of cellular (see Table A13) and between the political process and regulatory
performance when the latter is measured by price of cellular (see Table A14).
In instances where a certain lag length is accepted, we proceed to exam-
ine Granger-causality. From Table A12, we see that regulatory governance
causes regulatory performance when the latter is measured by cellular sub-
scription or monthly subscription to ¯xed. From Table A13, we see that
the institutional environment causes regulatory performance when the latter
is measured by mainline penetration, cellular subscription, or monthly sub-
scription to ¯xed service. Finally, we see from Table A14, that the data on
developing countries show that the political process causes regulatory per-
formance only when the latter is measured by cellular subscription. Figure
2 below summarizes our discussion of the existence of causality relationships
in the data on developed countries.




Variable local accountability global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml No Yes No
cel Yes Yes Yes
eff No No No
p res Yes Yes No
p cel No No No
in Tables A9-A14 support the proposition that, in developing as well as in
developed countries, there exists a causal relationship between political ac-
countability and regulatory performance. This is particularly true when we
examine political accountability through the quality of the institutional en-
vironment. Another interesting feature of the results is that global account-
ability variables seem to be in a stronger causal relationship with regulatory
performance than local accountability variables, and this is even more so in
developing countries. Even though the empirical evidence of such relation-
ships is admittedly stronger in the data on developing countries, we feel that
the importance of the issue from a policy point of view warrants a careful
analysis of the quantitative aspects of these relationships, a task which is
taken up next.
5.2 Regression estimation results
The preliminary analysis of the data performed so far sets the ground for a
scrutiny of the relationship between political accountability and regulatory
performance in the data on both the developing and developed countries. Let
us brie°y recall the di®erent steps and outcomes of this analysis. We have
started with a quick inspection of simple correlation coe±cients between the
variables used as proxies for these two concepts (see section 4). This light-
handed checkup of the data has led us to conclude that there are reasons
to believe that such a relationship exists indeed and is generally stronger
in developing countries. The next step then has been to search in the data
for evidence of a causal relationship running from political accountability to
20regulatory performance. We have tackled this task by means of Granger-
causality tests. These tests have also shown that such a causal relationship
exists, although we have found a stronger empirical support for this relation-
ship in the developing countries data (see subsection 5.1).
In addition to bringing empirical evidence on the causal relationship
between political accountability and regulatory performance, the Granger-
causality tests provided us with some further information on the dynamic
structure of this relationship. The end-product of this testing procedure is
a list of potential variables to be included as regressors when estimating the
quantitative impact of political accountability on regulatory performance.
In order to minimize the risk of estimation inaccuracy, a serious threat in
the context of dynamic data analysis which is ours, we made sure that, if
needed, the variables used to measure regulatory performance, the dependent
variables, were transformed so as to make them stationary (see section 4).
Tables 3 and 4 below report DIF-GMM estimations of regressions draw-
ing some of their main political accountability regressors from the set of
variables that have \passed" the causality test performed in the previous
section.33 The content of these two tables is similar to that of Tables A9-
A14 already discussed in the previous subsection. Two additional items
are appended however. First, we indicate, next to the entry \Endogenous
reforms," whether the variables privatization (priva), competition in ¯xed
(comp fix), competition in cellular (comp cel), and regulatory governance
index (reg) have been included in the regressions as endogenous regressors
or merely as exogenous.34 Second, we provide the value of a Wald statis-
tic for testing the joint signi¯cance of time-speci¯c e®ects captured in Time
dummies.35
33These variables are selected on the basis of the results detailed in Tables A9-A14
and summarized in Tables 1 and 2 given in the appendix and the previous subsection
respectively. For notational simplicity, in Tables 3 and 4 we take the transformations log
and ¢ as implicit.
34We have already alluded to this endogeneity problem in section 3 (see also footnote
15). The decision to include these variables as endogenous, and hence to instrument them,
was made on the basis of goodness-of-¯t.
35Testing for the presence of time-speci¯c e®ects seems particularly relevant in our
context since some important events have occurred during the period under study. These
events include, among others, the 1995 \Tequila" crisis, the 1997 South-asian crisis, the
1998-1999 ¯nancial breakdown, and some events related to technological progress such as
the introduction of digital systems.
21From Table 3 concerning the developing countries data, we see that, for
any of the ¯ve variables used to measure regulatory performance, namely,
mainline penetration (ml), cellular subscription (cel), mainline per employee
(eff), monthly subscription to ¯xed (p res), and price of cellular (p cel),
there is at least one variable used to represent political accountability which
signi¯cantly impacts it. Except when regulatory performance is measured
by the monthly subscription to ¯xed, the sign of this impact is as can be
expected, i.e., the higher the political accountability, the better the regula-
tory performance as re°ected in higher output (increase in mainline pene-
tration and cellular subscription), higher e±ciency (increase in mainlines per
employee), and lower prices (decrease in price of cellular). The apparently
counterintuitive case where we ¯nd that higher political accountability (less
risk of expropriation for operators and stronger checks and balances) leads to
a higher monthly subscription to ¯xed service might in fact only re°ect the
extent of tari® rebalancing that typically takes place in developing countries
during the early stages of the reforms. When we distinguish local account-
ability (regulatory governance) from global accountability, it is interesting
to note that the latter is more often found to have a signi¯cant impact on
regulatory performance. Nevertheless, in the cases when it is found to be sig-
ni¯cant, the e®ect of regulatory governance on regulatory performance has
the expected sign, namely, a better regulatory governance leads to a higher
output and a lower price.
The least we can say about the results obtained with the developed coun-
tries data set is that Table 4 which presents them does not convey the same
messages. A general comment that should be made at the outset is that
these results are poor compared with those obtained when the developing
countries data set is used. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 4, some reason-
able regressions could only be found when using either mainline penetration
(ml), cellular subscription (cel), or monthly subscription to ¯xed (p res) to
measure regulatory performance. As to the impact of political accountability
on regulatory performance, the only sensible results that could be recovered
from the data on developed countries is a positive e®ect of regulatory gov-
ernance (reg) on cellular subscription (cel) and a decrease in the monthly
subscription to the ¯xed service (p res) with a lowering of the currency risk
22to operators (currency).36 We ¯nally note that, for developing countries
where typically the divisions of powers is well balanced, the quality of the
political process as re°ected in the strength of checks and balances (checks)
turns out not to be signi¯cant in explaining regulatory performance.37
We note that the dummies used to capture time-speci¯c e®ects were al-
ways signi¯cant at the 10% or lower signi¯cance level which suggests that
attention should be given to important political and economic events in a
country when examining the performance of regulation. We also observe that
the reforms variables were used as endogenous regressors in all the regressions
except when regulatory performance was measured by cellular subscription
in the data set on developing countries and by the monthly subscription to
¯xed in the data set on developed countries. This is consistent with the idea
that reforms are increasingly performance-based.
To summarize, the ¯ndings suggest there are reasons to believe that local
political accountability (regulatory governance) is generally an important
determinant of regulatory performance in both developing and developed
countries. The story is not so clear when it comes to global accountability.
In the data set on developing countries, we found that the quality of the
political process and the institutional environment have a favorable on regu-
latory performance in terms of output, price and e±ciency. In contrast, with
the data set on developed countries the quality of the political process has
been found not to have a signi¯cant impact on regulatory performance and
the institutional environment showed even a negative impact on regulatory
performance as measured by output. Tables 5 and 6 below summarize our
discussion of the results on the impact of political accountability on regula-
tory performance.
36Two additional e®ects were found signi¯cant, but with unexpected signs, namely, a
lower risk of expropriation to operators was found to decrease mainline penetration and
cellular subscription.
37Note that this result is consistent with the implications of the simple correlation
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privait 0.066¤¤ 0.133 0.187¤¤¤
comp fixit -0.004 0.018 -0.119¤¤
comp celit 0.022¤¤ 0.146¤¤ 0.051¤
m1 -3.15¤¤¤ -2.61¤¤¤ -3.31¤¤¤
m2 1.55 0.33 -1.46
J 3.87 13.81 10.57
Time dummies 3.03¤¤¤ 8.20¤¤¤ 1.83¤
Endogenous reforms Yes No Yes
L 5 2 3
Obs. 295 318 316











comp fixit -0.147¤ 0.001




Time dummies 15.21¤¤¤ 2.01¤
Endogenous reforms Yes Yes
L 2 2
Obs. 152 162
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1)
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privait -0.014¤ 0.033 -0.017
comp fixit 0.014¤ -0.043 -0.016
comp celit -0.004 0.000 -0.044
m1 -2.72¤¤¤ -3.45¤¤¤ -3.33¤¤¤
m2 0.22 -2.11¤¤ -0.96
J 2.52 2.52 4.18
Time dummies 4.06¤¤¤ 5.00¤¤¤ 43.94¤¤¤
Endogenous reforms Yes Yes No
L 2 2 2
Obs. 276 253 182
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and
(L ¡ 1) for the equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels
respectively.
Table 5
Impact of political accountability on regulatory performance
(developing countries)
Variables local accountability global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml + NS +
cel NA + +
eff NA + NA
p res ¡ + +
p cel ¡ ¡ NA
Note: NA ans NS stand for not applicable and not signi¯cant respectively.
25Table 6
Impact of political accountability on regulatory performance
(developed countries)
Variable local accountability global accountability
reg institutional checks
ml NA ¡ NA
cel + ¡ NS
eff NA NA NA
p res NS ¡ NA
p cel NA NA NA
Note: NA and NS stand for not applicable and not signi¯cant respectively.
6 Conclusion
The quality of political institutions has long been emphasized in both the
academic and the institutional spheres as being a crucial determinant of
economic performance. This paper is a ¯rst attempt to draw lessons from
the recent conceptual literature concerned with the role of the economy-wide
governance in the shaping of regulatory outcomes and feed them into the
more empirical approach that directly examines the impact of sector-wide
governance on regulatory performance. Our \integrated" empirical approach
rests on the idea that political accountability is a key factor in the interface
between political and regulatory structures. This approach is illustrated
for the case of telecommunications in developing and developed countries
by analyzing the impact of political accountability variables on regulatory
performance variables in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets.
In this paper we have used two sets of variables to capture political ac-
countability, local accountability variables and global accountability vari-
ables. Local accountability variables include most of the features related
to \regulatory governance," namely, unbundling of regulation from policy
making, autonomy and independence of the regulator, accountability of the
regulator, clarity in the allocation of mandates and attributes among gov-
ernment institutions, legal aspects, transparency of regulatory practices, and
participation in the regulatory process. These variables were synthesized
in a regulatory governance index. Global accountability variables include
variables concerning corruption, bureaucracy, law and order, expropriation,
26currency risk, and checks and balances. We have estimated the impact of
these political accountability variables on regulatory performance when the
latter is measured by mainline penetration, cellular subscription, mainlines
per employee, monthly subscription to the ¯xed, or price of cellular. Our
empirical analysis of the two samples has shown a relatively weak e®ect of
political accountability on the performance of regulation in developed coun-
tries and a clear cutting e®ect in the case of developing countries where we
found that the higher the political accountability, the better the regulatory
performance. What implications can one derive from such a ¯nding?
During the last two decades, many developing countries have created reg-
ulatory agencies mostly relying on advice provided by international ¯nancial
institutions (IFIs) and international lawyers to implement these regulatory
models. New regulatory institutions were however not tailored or customized
enough to ¯t the local cultural, political and social endowments. Our paper
once again stresses this very important requirement for success in developing
new institutions. Furthermore, the paper goes beyond most current analyses
in the area by extending the focus of the analysis to what we have referred
to as issues of \global accountability" which re°ect the quality of political
institutions.
Recent contributions have deepened the understanding of regulatory e®ec-
tiveness along two dimensions. The ¯rst dimension is regulatory governance,
a concept which is a bit broader than what our de¯nition in this paper en-
compasses. The second is regulatory substance, a concept which is meant to
capture the way regulation is actually performed. Brown et al (2006) have
proposed a comprehensive evaluation process of the e®ectiveness of regula-
tory institutions. If implemented, this process will highlight not only the
structural weaknesses but also the de¯ciencies stemming from the surround-
ing environment of regulation, in particular, the political environment.
It is thus important to devise policy mitigation instruments that incor-
porate both of these dimensions. Unfortunately, common practices during
the last decade or so have shown that donors' interventions are centered on
structural issues. The analysis conducted in this paper clearly advocates for
27the de¯nition of a set of instruments of e®ective intervention with the ob-
jective of achieving political accountability improvements in the practice of
regulation. Indeed, building regulatory institutions in developing countries
should be part of a broader strategy of \good governance" and not only be
considered, as it has been in the past years, as a sectoral matter.
International donors, including the World Bank, the Department for In-
ternational Development, and others have been strong and e®ective advocates
for good governance since many years, but a sound policy for supporting
the development of politically accountable systems in developing countries
has yet to be designed. The general wisdom is that in order to promote
good governance one has to support the development of demand and sup-
ply institutions for governance. Supply side institutions involve structural
mechanisms for establishing a set of institutions with the goal of promot-
ing accountability, whereas demand side institutions are those that advocate
for good governance. Assuming that good governance is promoted, political
accountability improves and so does the performance of regulation.38
A further aspect that needs to be highlighted is that established regula-
tory agencies need long term support so that they can signi¯cantly improve
regulatory practice. As opposed to the short term approach relied upon
during the past years, IFIs should de¯ne long term programs to support
regulatory institutions newly established so the latter can build the human
capital as well as develop the technical tools and instruments required by an
e±cient practice of regulation.
In designing reforms in the 1990s, the World Bank has usually included
capacity building components in its loans to provide such support to regu-
lators. However, although the intention was encouraging, this approach had
su®ered from two caveats. First, the approach was a short term one in that
these programs assumed that newly established regulatory agencies will be-
come self sustaining in ¯ve years whereas their host environments did not
really support the development of such institutions. Consequently, as soon
as the World Bank loan is signed or closed, most regulators did not bene¯t
38A country such as Chile demonstrates to some extent such a cycle.
28from the support of their governments, were side-lined at best, or captured.
Second, the approach was lacking appropriate mitigation instruments to deal
with the political environment. The issue is how do we make regulation po-
litically acceptable or supported. Little was done to understand the political
game while establishing regulatory agencies. As a result, donors did not
have a clear understanding of the political requirements to make regulation
acceptable in a given country. Instead, the debate centered on ring fenc-
ing regulatory agencies from political interference forgetting that regulation,
in institutional terms, is no more than a delegation of power from elected
o±cials to bureaucrats.
With this in mind, technical assistance programs typically involved train-
ing programs (skills building, hands on) to build up the human capital base,
on the one hand, and helping the board or management of regulatory agen-
cies to establish and comply with approved procedures and regulations, on
the other hand. In e®ect, international development partners could also rely
on a stick and carrot approach to catalyze necessary changes at the political
level. Doing this would imply working only with those countries which are
committed to improving political accountability.
To sum up, future reforms should not only devote attention to improving
regulatory governance (structural requirements, regulatory substance), but
should pay much more attention to understanding the political context within
which regulatory institutions will be performing in. In developed countries,
as our quantitative results have shown, political accountability is already
well established and practiced through an e®ective use by the electorate of
its votes as a sanction tool. The focus therefore in those countries is on
regulatory governance. In developing countries, political accountability is at
an early stage of development and hence this calls for additional means and
resources from development partners to promote good governance which will
in turn enhance the quality of regulation.
29Appendix
² Data on developing countries
A ¯rst data set contains observations on the following list of 29 devel-
oping countries during the period 1985-1999:
India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, C^ ote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Jordan, Morocco,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, El
Salvador, and Venezuela.
Information have been collected on variables regrouped in ¯ve cate-
gories: Regulatory performance, local accountability, global account-
ability, and other variables. The designation of these variables, their




² Mainline penetration ITU
² Cellular subscription ITU
Efficiency
² Mainlines per employee ITU
Price
² Monthly subscription to ¯xed ITU




² Separation of the regulator -Bortolotti et al. (2001),




-Clark et al. (2004).
autonomy/independence
² Regulator's budget -Clark et al. (2004).
² Can members of the regulatory commis-
sion be ¯red by the executive?
-Idem
² Can the minister/president veto the reg-
ulator's decisions?
-Idem
² Has the minister/president written pol-
icy guidelines during the past year?
-Idem
Accountability
² Is accounting separation mandatory? -Idem
² Can the operator appeal if it disagrees
with regulator's decisions?
-Idem
² Can other parties appeal? -Idem
clarity of allocation of tasks
² Who is in charge of resolving (intercon-
nection) disputes?
-Idem
² Who controls pricing? -Idem
² Who controls the procedure of licence
granting?
-Idem
² Who decides on the number of licenses
to be granted?
-Idem




² What type of approval is required for
private ¯rms in order to operate?
-Idem
participation/transparency
² Are regulatory meetings open to the
public?
-Idem




² Regulatory governance index -Index computed from values





² Corruption -IRIS dataset by Steve Knack and Philip Keefer
for the IRIS Center at the University of Mary-
land (1982-1997).
-International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk
ratings (1997-1999).
² Bureaucracy -Idem.
² Law and order -Idem.
² Expropriation -IRIS dataset by Steve Knack and Philip Keefer
for the IRIS Center at the University of Mary-
land (1982-1997).
² Currency risk -Exchange Rate Stability, International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) risk ratings (1985-1999).
² Institutional en-
vironment index
-Index computed from values of the previous in-
stitutionalization variables.
Quality of the political process
² Checks and bal-
ances
-DPI2000 Database of Political Institutions
1975-2000, Philip Keefer (Development Re-
search Group), The World Bank (2002).
32Other variables
Variable Source(s)
² Privatization -Various authors (Ros, 1999, 2003, Bortolotti
et al., 2001, McNary, 2001, Li and Xu, 2004,
Fink et al., 2002).
-ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory
database.
-Operators and regulators websites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-Private Partcipation in Infrastructure (PPI)
Project World Bank database.




-Various authors (Ros, 1999, 2003, Bortolotti
et al., 2001, McNary, 2001, Li and Xu, 2004,
Fink et al., 2002).
-ITU World Telecommunications Regulatory
database.
-Operators and regulatory authorities web-
sites.
-Clark et al. (2004).
-http://www.gsmworld.com.





. Mainline penetration: Number of telephone lines per 100 in-
habitants that connect the subscribers' terminal equipment
to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).
. Cellular subscription: Number of users of portable telephones
subscribing to a mobile telephone service with access to the
PSTN.
- E±ciency
. Mainlines per employee: Number of mainlines per employee
in the ¯xed service activity.
- Price
. Monthly subscription to ¯xed: Recurring ¯xed charge (in 2000
US dollars) paid by residential subscribers to the PSTN. This
33charge covers only the rental of the line, not that of the ter-
minal.
. Price of cellular: Price (in 2000 US dollars) paid for a 3-minute
call during peak hours from a cellular telephone. For reasons
of inter-country comparability, this price corresponds to that
of a call placed with a pre-paid card.
Local accountability
- Structuration of regulation
. Separation of the regulator: Dichotomous variable which takes
on the value 1 if the regulatory agency is separated from and
not directly controlled by a ministry or a utility, and 0 other-
wise.
- Autonomy/Independence
. Regulator's budget: Trichotomous variable which takes on the
value 1 if the regulatory agency is ¯nanced from licence fees
or donors contributions, 0 if it is ¯nanced from the general
budget of the government, and 0:5 if it is ¯nanced from both
types of sources.
. Can members of the regulatory commission be ¯red by the
executive?: Dichotomous variable with value 1 if the answer
to the question is \no," and 0 if the answer is \yes."
. Can the minister/president veto the regulator's decisions?:
Dichotomous variable which takes on the value 1 if the answer
to the question is \no," and 0 if the answer is \yes."
. Has the minister/president written policy guidelines during
the past year?: Dichotomous variable with value 1 if the an-
swer to the question is \no," and 0 if the answer is \yes."
- Accountability
. Is accounting separation mandatory?: Dichotomous variable
which takes on the value 1 if the answer to the question is
\yes," and 0 if the answer is \no."
34. Can the operator appeal if it disagrees with regulator's deci-
sions?: Dichotomous variable which takes on the value 1 if the
answer to the question is \yes," and 0 if the answer is \no."
. Can other parties appeal?: Dichotomous variable with value
1 if the answer to the question is \yes," and 0 if the answer is
\no."
- Clarity of allocation of tasks
. Who is in charge of resolving (interconnection) disputes?: Di-
chotomous variable with value 1 if the answer to the question
is \the regulator," and 0 if the answer is \the ministry" or
\nobody."
. Who controls pricing? (this variable concerns pricing of ¯xed
(local), domestic long distance, international, ISP, and mobile
services): Trichotomous variable which takes on the value 1 if
the answer is \the regulator," 0 if the answer is \the ministry"
or \nobody," and 0:5 if the answer is \both the regulator and
the ministry."
. Who controls the procedure of license granting? (this con-
cerns licenses for ¯xed (local), domestic long distance, inter-
national, ISP, and mobile services): Trichotomous variable
with value 1 if the answer to the question is \the regulator,"
0 if the answer is \the ministry," and 0:5 if the answer is \both
the regulator and the ministry."
. Who decides on the number of licences to be granted?: Tri-
chotomous variable with value 1 if the answer to the question
is \the regulator," 0 if the answer is \the ministry" or \no-
body," and 0:5 if the answer is \both the regulator and the
ministry."
. Who controls the procedure of spectrum allocation?: Dichoto-
mous variable which takes on the value 1 if the answer to the
question is \the regulator," and 0 if the answer is \the min-
istry."
35- Legal aspects
. What type of approval is required for private ¯rms in order
to operate?: Trichotomous variable which takes on the value
1 if the answer to the question is \a formal approval," 0 if the
answer is \no approval at all," and 0:5 if the answer is \just
a noti¯cation."
- Participation/Transparency
. Are regulatory meetings open to the public?: Trichotomous
variable with value 1 if the answer to the question is \yes, all
of them," 0 if the answer is \not at all," and 0:5 if the answer
is \yes, some of them."
. Are explanations of regulatory decisions published?: Dichoto-
mous variable which takes on the value 1 if the answer to the
question is \yes," and 0 if the answer is \no."
- Regulatory governance
. Regulator governance index: Variable which takes on the
value 0 when the value of the variable separation of the reg-
ulator is 0, i.e., when regulation is directly exercised by a
ministry or a utility. When the variable separation of the reg-
ulator takes on the value 1, i.e., when there exists a separated
regulatory agency, this regulatory governance index takes on
a value between 1 and 15 computed as the sum of the values
taken by the local accountability variables described above




. Corruption: Variable with values ranging from 0 to 10 and
meant to re°ect the degree of corruption of the political sys-
tem. The higher the value of the variable, the less corrupt the
political system. The particular concern here is with actual or
36potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepo-
tism, job reservations, favors for favors, secret party funding,
and close ties between politicians and business.
. Bureaucracy: Variable with values between 0 and 10 used to
assess the quality of the bureaucracy. Higher points are at-
tributed to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policies or
interruption in government services.
. Law and order: Variable taking values between 0 and 10. The
\Law" part of this variable is used to assess the strength and
impartiality of the legal system (e.g., due to the existence
of a strong judiciary system). The \Order" part gives an
indication of the popular observance of the law (e.g., low crime
rate or law not routinely ignored as with illegal strikes without
e®ective sanctions). Higher values of this variable re°ect a
better judiciary system.
. Expropriation: Variable with values in the range 0-10 meant
to assess the risk of expropriation of private investments in
terms of outright con¯scation or forced nationalization. Higher
values of this variable re°ect less risk of this type for opera-
tors.
. Currency risk: Variable taking values between 0 and 10 which
captures the risk of operators stemming from exchange rate
°uctuations. Again, higher values of this variable re°ect a
lower risk of this type.
. Institutional environment index: Variable whose value is found
by summing the values taken by the ¯ve institutionalization
variables described above. Hence, the values of this institu-
tional environment index are in the range 0-50. Higher values
of this index re°ect a better overall institutional environment.
- Quality of the political process
. Checks and balances: Variable with values in the range 0-
18 meant to give some indication on the division of powers.39
39This variable \..counts the number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for
37Higher values of this variable re°ect more balanced division of
powers and, accordingly, a better functioning of the political
process.
Other variables
. Privatization: Variable giving the % of the incumbent's assets sold
to private investors.
. Competition in ¯xed: Dichotomous variable which takes on the
value 0 if the local segment (¯xed) is a monopoly, and 1 if there
are two or more operators in this segment.
. Competition in cellular: Variable which takes on the value 0 if no
license for cellular (analogue and digital) has been issued, 1 if one
licence has been issued, 2 if two licenses have been issued, and 3
if three or more licenses have been issued.
² Data on developed countries
A second data set concerns the following list of 23 developed countries
during the same period 1985-1999:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and United States.
Given the many similarities between this data set and the developing
countries data set described at length above, below we give information
only on items that are di®erent in the developed countries data set.
whether these veto players are independent of each other, as determined by the level of
electoral competitiveness in the system, their respective party a±liations, and the electoral




² Separation of the regulator -Trends in Telecommunica-
tion Reform 1999: Conver-








² Overruling of the regulator's decisions -Idem
clarity of allocation of tasks
² Who resolves (interconnection) dis-
putes?
-Idem
² Who authorizes interconnection
charges?
-Idem
² Who controls pricing? -Idem
² Who controls quality of service? -Idem
² Who is responsible of the issuing of li-
cences?
-Idem




² Regulatory governance index -Index computed from values




² Privatization -Various authors (Ros, 1999, McNary, 2001, Li and
Xu, 2004).
-Trends in Telecommunication Reform 1999: Con-
vergence and Regulation. ITU.
² Competition in
¯xed
-Various authors (Ros, 1999, McNary, 2001, Li and
Xu, 2004).
-Trends in Telecommunication Reform 1999: Con-
vergence and Regulation. ITU.




- Structuration of regulation
. Separation of the regulator: Dichotomous variable which takes
on the value 1 if there exists a separated regulatory agency not
directly controlled by a ministry or a utility, and 0 otherwise.
- Autonomy/Independence
. Regulator's budget: Trichotomous variable which takes on the
value 1 if the regulatory agency is ¯nanced from licence fees
or operators' contributions, 0 if it is ¯nanced from the general
budget of the government, and 0:5 if it is ¯nanced from both
types of sources.
. Overruling of the regulator's decisions: Dichotomous variable
which takes on the value 1 if there do not exist organizations
other than the courts that can overrule the regulator's deci-
sions, and 0 if such organizations exist.
- Clarity of allocation of tasks
. Who resolves (interconnection) disputes?: Dichotomous vari-
able with value 1 if the answer to the question is \the regu-
lator," \the competition authority," or \the courts," and 0 if
the answer is \the ministry."
. Who authorizes interconnection charges? (this concerns in-
terconnection with the networks of operators with signi¯cant
market power): Dichotomous variable which takes on the
value 1 if the answer to the question is \the regulator" or
\the competition authority," and 0 if the answer is \the min-
istry" or \nobody."
. Who controls pricing?: Dichotomous variable with value 1 if
the answer to the question is \the regulator" or \the compe-
tition authority," and 0 if the answer is \the ministry."
. Who controls quality of service?: Dichotomous variable with
value 1 if the answer to the question is \the regulator" or \the
competition authority," and 0 if the answer is \the ministry"
or \nobody."
40. Who is responsible of the issuing of licences? (this concerns
licenses for ¯xed and mobile services): Trichotomous variable
with value 1 if the answer to the question is \the regulator
for both types of licenses," 0 if the answer is \the ministry for
both types of licenses," and 0:5 if the answer is \the regulator
for one license and the ministry for the other."
. Who is in charge of allocating the spectrum?: Trichotomous
variable which takes on the value 1 if the answer to the ques-
tion is \the regulator," 0 if the answer is \the ministry," and
0:5 if the answer is \both the regulator and the ministry."
- Regulatory governance
. Regulatory governance index: This variable takes on the value
0 when there is no separation between the regulator and the
ministry or the utility. When such a separation exists, this
variable takes on a value between 1 and 8 calculated as the
sum of the values taken by the local accountability variables
described above.
Other variables
. Privatization: Dichotomous variable which takes on the value 1 if
the assets of the incumbent have been partly (or totally) sold to
private investors, and 0 if the incumbent is State-owned.
. Competition in ¯xed: Dichotomous variable with value equal to
1 if there is more than one operator in the local segment (¯xed),
and equal to 0 if this segment is a monopoly.
. Competition in cellular: Dichotomous variable with value 1 if
there is more than one operator in the cellular segment (analogue





Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 435 5.27 4.96 0.11 22.36
cel Cellular subscription 431 0.81 2.09 0 15.96
eff Mainlines per employee 424 68.87 58.85 7.78 371.16
p res Monthly subscription to ¯xed 256 5.71 4.23 0 21.29
p cel Price of cellular 324 0.37 0.53 0 2.24
reg Regulatory governance index 435 2.59 4.60 0 13.5
corruption Corruption 435 5.07 1.43 1.66 10
bureau Bureaucracy 420 4.84 1.86 1.66 10
law Law and order 435 4.98 2.06 0 10
expropri Expropriation 420 7.24 2.00 2 10
currency Currency risk 435 5.88 1.98 1 10
institutional Institutional environment index 435 27.60 7.10 8 41.16
checks Checks and balances 423 3.12 2.06 1 18
priva Privatization 435 0.16 0.32 0 1
comp fix Competition in ¯xed 435 0.09 0.29 0 1




ml cel eff p res p cel
institutional 0.41 0.65 0.42 0.23 0.60
checks 0.34 0.39 0.36 -0.01 0.30
reg 0.19 0.57 0.30 -0.06 0.61
42Table A3
Compounded annual rates of increase
(developing countries)
Country global accountability regulatory performance
institutional checks ml cely eff p resyy p cely
India 2.57 10.40 14.18 118.61 13.76 -2.83 -
Sri Lanka 3.62 3.71 14.65 40.02 14.07 5.70 -2.23
Malaysia -0.13 2.07 8.90 28.66 12.71 -7.86 -11.25
Pakistan 2.77 8.16 11.75 57.12 11.56 13.14 -5.53
Thailand 2.38 1.31 14.75 14.65 13.03 -8.03 -11.26
C^ ote d'Ivoire 0.15 5.07 7.14 105.48 10.62 -12.26 -
Ghana 5.42 8.17 7.68 78.50 13.40 -9.51 -
Kenya 0.20 8.16 3.89 74.52 1.42 6.25 -34.55
Malawi 0.47 10.40 2.92 171.59 -4.78 -15.62 19.35
Tanzania 3.05 8.16 4.80 89.82 8.63 -4.46 63.99
Uganda 5.85 -9.50 2.91 129.95 6.82 44.94 -
South Africa 0.13 5.07 4.55 72.68 10.54 -3.97 -9.59
Jordan 3.77 0 5.30 72.03 5.72 -2.08 -7.83
Morocco 3.73 0 11.84 85.92 7.44 10.86 -16.24
Argentina 4.18 6.76 5.82 74.78 14.10 6.49 1.04
Bolivia 10.49 12.18 6.18 169.71 2.76 -0.24 -17.66
Brazil -0.36 -1.58 7.60 81.47 9.98 54.21 -11.90
Chile 3.43 10.40 11.61 81.66 8.31 -7.48 -
Colombia 1.23 1.60 7.62 60.50 5.67 -8.84 -4.66
Costa Rica 1.60 5.07 7.67 62.27 7.03 -0.18 -12.28
Dominican Rep. 3.52 12.18 11.60 64.18 8.29 76.53 -
Ecuador 0.13 0 8.37 78.41 9.66 19.69 8.53
Guatemala 5.60 5.07 9.18 139.78 13.17 -2.15 -13.03
Honduras 3.79 0 10.47 32.64 11.71 -7.73 -
Jamaica 4.20 0 13.22 137.08 12.17 19.81 0.40
Panama 2.29 2.07 5.50 89.33 4.84 -19.55 -
Peru 4.46 -4.83 8.57 143.06 17.42 27.36 6.58
El Salvador 6.49 2.07 10.82 71.02 15.60 45.10 -5.95
Venezuela 1.89 5.07 3.03 85.97 6.67 22.61 -12.49
Average 3.00 4.04 8.36 85.97 9.39 8.27 -3.64
y: Figures computed for the period 1995-1999.




Variable Designation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ml Mainline penetration 345 48.09 10.87 14.52 73.56
cel Cellular subscription 344 8.92 13.51 0 63.37
eff Mainlines per employee 345 168.59 57.53 43.48 358.76
p res Monthly subscription to ¯xed 252 13.87 4.70 5.60 26.27
p cel Price of cellular 192 1.37 0.86 0 4.95
reg Regulatory governance index 345 2.62 3.11 0 8
corruption Corruption 345 8.73 1.37 3.33 10
bureau Bureaucracy 345 9.30 1.33 4.5 10
law Law and order 345 9.42 1.11 5 10
expropri Expropriation 345 9.73 0.66 4.6 10
currency Currency risk 345 8.68 1.16 4 10
institutional Institutional environment index 345 45.88 3.99 25.26 50
checks Checks and balances 345 4.46 1.62 2 16
priva Privatization 345 0.38 0.48 0 1
comp fix Competition in ¯xed 345 0.23 0.42 0 1




ml cel eff p res p cel
institutional 0.63 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.01
checks 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.24
reg 0.43 0.55 0.05 0.01 -0.07
44Table A6
Compounded annual rates of increase
(developed countries)
Country global accountability regulatory performance
institutional checks ml cely eff p resyy p cely
Australia 0.30 1.60 1.98 28.04 3.98 -1.94 -4.86
Austria 0.31 0 2.10 82.20 2.34 -1.49 -24.03
Belgium -0.50 -5.87 3.36 91.28 4.36 4.86 -11.73
Canada 0.29 0 2.16 26.64 4.30 5.11 -3.51
Denmark 0.29 0 2.31 33.17 1.50 -0.98 -12.39
Finland 0.29 -2.03 1.52 33.30 1.66 10.75 -16.69
France -0.47 1.60 2.36 100.73 2.63 6.23 9.97
Germany 0.72 -1.58 2.48 50.22 4.37 -5.63 -4.72
Greece 3.48 0 3.78 93.65 6.91 2.67 -
Iceland 0.59 -2.03 3.25 52.23 5.02 3.31 -
Ireland 0.33 0 6.24 78.79 7.24 -1.92 7.37
Italy 0.86 0 3.02 66.69 5.50 10.78 -9.26
Japan -0.55 0 1.94 48.11 6.63 -0.07 -25.33
Luxembourg 0.07 -1.58 4.03 64.84 3.31 10.25 -26.66
Netherlands 0.14 1.60 2.97 86.97 -0.19 2.08 -5.32
New Zealand -0.02 0 1.35 38.32 12.18 -0.76 17.35
Norway 0.25 0 1.83 28.53 0.01 0.74 -16.49
Portugal 2.40 0 7.93 92.03 9.15 -0.81 -14.54
Spain 1.10 2.07 3.81 98.37 4.97 -4.30 5.77
Sweden 0.37 2.07 1.13 26.55 4.33 2.31 -5.07
Switzerland -0.24 1.07 2.47 60.92 1.14 -1.43 -21.80
United King. 0.35 -2.03 3.07 46.92 4.53 2.67 -0.39
United States -0.10 0 2.41 24.85 1.74 -1.70 -38.31
Average 0.44 -0.17 2.94 59.19 4.26 1.77 -9.55
y: Figures computed for the period 1995-1999.
yy: Figures computed for the period 1993-1999.
² Stationarity of regulatory performance series
45Table A7
Stationarity tests of regulatory performance variables
(developing countries)
log(mlit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM ¢log(mlit) DIF-GMM
log(mlit¡1) 0.785¤¤¤ 1.024¤¤¤ ¢log(mlit¡1) 0.382¤¤¤
Time 0.018¤¤¤ 0.003¤¤¤ Time 0.001
m1 -2.22¤¤ -2.62¤¤¤ m1 -3.45¤¤¤
m2 1.46 1.07 m2 2.10¤¤
J 22.84 27.34 J 26.99
Dif-Sargan 4.5
L 2 2 L 4
Obs. 377 406 Obs. 348
log(celit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM ¢log(celit) DIF-GMM
log(celit¡1) 0.965¤¤¤ 1.020¤¤¤ ¢log(celit¡1) 0.308¤
Time 0.044¤¤¤ 0.045¤¤¤ Time 0.024¤¤
m1 -0.72 -0.82 m1 -2.45¤¤
m2 0.31 0.22 m2 0.73
J 28.95 28.52 J 27.91
Dif-Sargan -0.43
L 2 2 L 2
Obs. 371 401 Obs. 342
log(effit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM ¢log(effit) DIF-GMM
log(effit¡1) 0.751¤¤¤ 1.015¤¤¤ ¢log(effit¡1) 0.023
Time 0.028¤¤¤ 0.005 Time 0.004
m1 -2.57¤¤ -2.59¤¤ m1 -3.26¤¤¤
m2 -1.51 -1.48 m2 -1.16
J 27.90 27.40 J 26.55
Dif-Sargan -0.50
L 2 2 L 2
Obs. 359 391 Obs. 328
log(p resit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM








log(p celit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM








Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1) for the equation in ¯rst
di®erences and levels respectively.
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log(p celit) DIF-GMM SYS-GMM








Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L




Causality tests for local accountability variables
(developing countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 0.249¤¤¤ 0.278¤¤ -0.164
yit¡2 0.039 -0.253¤¤¤
yit¡3 -0.264¤¤¤
regit¡1 0.002¤¤ 0.001 -0.001
regit¡2 -0.001 -0.004
regit¡3 0.001
corruptionit 0.005 0.054¤¤ 0.009
bureauit -0.001 -0.008 0.016
lawit -0.001 -0.001 0.001
expropriit 0.003 0.010 0.002
currencyit -0.004¤ 0.011 0.009
checksit 0.004¤¤ -0.016 0.009¤
privait 0.075¤¤¤ 0.346¤ 0.205¤¤¤
comp fixit -0.025¤¤ -0.025 -0.101¤¤
comp celit 0.004 0.139¤ 0.018
m1 -11.36¤¤¤ -2.24¤¤ -3.03¤¤¤
m2 1.44 0.88 -0.43
J 227.75 14.06 14.44
L 2 4 2
Obs. 268 318 275
Lag length 7.02¤¤¤ 2.47¤¤ 7.97¤¤¤
Causality 2.19¤ 0.14 0.47














comp fixit -0.169¤¤ 1.105






Lag length 3.84¤¤ 13.90¤¤¤
Causality 3.35¤ 4.15¤¤
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1)
for the equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
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Causality tests for institutionalization variables
(developing countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 0.257¤¤ 0.232¤ -0.097
yit¡2 0.067
yit¡3 -0.248¤¤¤
regit 0.001 0.001 -0.003
institutionalit¡1 0.002 0.014¤¤ 0.005¤
institutionalit¡2 0.002
institutionalit¡3 -0.004¤¤
checksit 0.004¤ -0.004 0.010¤
privait 0.074¤¤ 0.258¤¤¤ 0.172¤¤¤
comp fixit -0.023 0.046 -0.114¤¤
comp celit 0.06 0.037¤ 0.011
m1 -3.51¤¤¤ -2.41¤¤ -3.14¤¤¤
m2 1.06 0.79 -1.69¤
J 14.08 23.48 22.39
L 2 2 2
Obs. 278 330 316
Lag length 12.06¤¤¤ 4.51¤ 5.84¤¤¤
Causality 5.71¤¤¤ 6.36¤¤ 3.25¤










comp fixit -0.181¤¤ -0.016






Lag length 6.07¤¤¤ 6.62¤¤¤
Causality 4.29¤¤ 9.35¤¤¤
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1) for the
equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
50Table A11
Causality tests for quality of the political process variables
(developing countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 0.245¤¤ 0.342¤¤ -0.212¤¤
yit¡2 0.069 -0.273¤¤¤
yit¡3 -0.215¤¤¤
regit -0.001 0.007 -0.003
corruptionit 0.04¤¤ 0.056¤¤¤ 0.007
bureauit 0.001 -0.012 0.018
lawit -0.001 0.006 0.001
expropriit 0.005 -0.013 -0.001
currencyit -0.003¤ 0.012 0.009
checksit¡1 0.002 0.017¤¤ 0.007
checksit¡2 0.003¤ 0.009
checksit¡3 -0.004¤
privait 0.074¤¤ 0.160 0.199¤¤¤
comp fixit -0.026 0.039 -0.092¤
comp celit 0.010¤ 0.093¤¤ 0.019
m1 -3.39¤¤¤ -2.44¤¤ -2.87¤¤¤
m2 1.69¤ 0.44 -0.50
J 8.58 18.08 10.12
L 2 2 2
Obs. 265 318 274
Lag length 9.85¤¤¤ 4.87¤¤ 7.89¤¤¤
Causality 6.33¤¤¤ 5.42¤¤ 1.57













comp fixit -0.184¤¤ 0.030¤






Lag length 6.40¤¤¤ 8.00¤¤¤
Causality 5.31¤¤ 0.09
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1)
for the equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
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Causality tests for local accountability variables
(developed countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 0.061 0.680¤¤¤ -0.521¤¤¤
yit¡2 -0.307¤¤¤ -0.353¤¤
yit¡3 -0.235¤¤¤
regit¡1 -0.001 0.002 -0.009
regit¡2 0.012¤¤ -0.001
regit¡3 -0.009
corruptionit 0.006 -0.030 0.109¤¤
bureauit -0.014¤¤¤ 0.003 -0.055
lawit -0.005 -0.007 -0.039
expropriit 0.002 -0.004 0.256
currencyit -0.001 0.001 -0.016
checksit -0.002 0.020 0.063¤¤
privait -0.011 0.050 -0.050
comp fixit 0.014¤¤ -0.005 0.127
comp celit -0.003 0.046 0.088
m1 -2.63¤¤¤ -3.86¤¤¤ -2.49¤¤
m2 0.85 0.97 -0.33
J 12.51 4.54 5.28
L 2 2 2
Obs. 276 252 230
Lag length 0.32 8.38¤¤¤ 5.39¤¤
Causality 9.17¤¤¤ 0.48














comp fixit -0.121 -0.099






Lag length 17.84¤¤¤ 1.61
Causality 2.92¤
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1)
for the equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
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Causality tests for institutionalization variables
(developed countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 0.101 0.615¤¤¤ -0.268¤
yit¡2 0.032 -0.244¤¤¤
yit¡3 -0.034
regit 0.001 0.015¤¤ -0.008
institutionalit¡1 0.001 -0.017¤ 0.006
institutionalit¡2 -0.003¤¤ 0.012
institutionalit¡3 0.022
checksit -0.001 0.011 0.045¤
privait -0.017¤ 0.051 -0.054
comp fixit 0.007 -0.014 -0.001
comp celit -0.007 0.033 0.013
m1 -2.53¤¤ -3.93¤¤¤ -2.01¤¤
m2 0.73 -0.13 -0.81
J 16.61 9.68 17.22
L 2 2 2
Obs. 253 229 276
Lag length 3.52¤¤ 3.97¤ 2.08
Causality 3.57¤¤ 4.07¤¤









comp fixit 0.023 -0.079






Lag length 2.73¤ 0.42
Causality 4.91¤¤
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1) for the
equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
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Causality tests for quality of the political process variables
(developed countries)
yit ¢log(mlit) ¢log(celit) ¢log(effit)
yit¡1 -0.001 0.718¤¤¤ -0.453¤¤
yit¡2 0.203¤¤ -0.280¤¤¤ -0.301¤¤
yit¡3 -0.229¤¤¤
regit 0.002 0.013¤¤¤ -0.013
corruptionit 0.007 -0.033 0.097¤
bureauit -0.048¤¤¤ 0.057 -0.019
lawit 0.001 0.022 -0.017
expropriit 0.025 0.096 0.122
currencyit -0.003 0.007 -0.014
checksit¡1 -0.001 0.016¤¤ 0.058¤
checksit¡2 0.001 -0.013 0.025
checksit¡3 -0.021
privait -0.007 0.027 -0.044
comp fixit -0.003 -0.032 0.065
comp celit -0.004 0.049 0.084
m1 -2.64¤¤¤ -3.82¤¤¤ -1.63
m2 0.73 0.22 -1.49
J 10.82 15.87 3.74
L 2 2 2
Obs. 253 252 230
Lag length 3.47¤¤ 1.74¤¤¤ 5.72¤¤
Causality 0.24 3.57¤¤ 1.54













comp fixit -0.063 -0.051






Lag length 4.14¤¤ 1.14
Causality 2.04
Note: The starting lag for the instruments is L and (L ¡ 1)
for the equation in ¯rst di®erences and levels respectively.
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